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Abstract
It is well-known that switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a
market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good,
provided the switching cost is above some critical level. We show that intro-
ducing consumer heterogeneity tends to increase the critical switching cost
and thereby reduce the stability of the collusive outcome. A testable impli-
cation is that widespread price discrimination should go hand in hand with
eﬀorts to create switching costs.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A wave of privatization and deregulation has rolled over the world in recent years.
The old national monopolies — be it railroad services, airlines, telecommunication
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1or electricity provision or distribution — now typically have been forced to share
their markets with one or more entrants. This give rise to numerous interesting
issues of competition in general and pricing behavior in particular. A particular
problem facing the ﬁrms is how to escape the Bertrand paradox: they compete
in markets for more or less homogeneous goods, with prices as the main strategic
variable. In our view, the most compelling solution to the paradox is the existence
of switching costs: the fact that even if consumers don’t care about which product
they start to buy, there may be costs associated with switching suppliers.1 These
costs dampen competition in mature markets in a variety of settings, as shown by
Paul Klemperer in numerous articles (see his 1995 survey). Recent eﬀorts to raise
barriers for consumers who might consider to switch supplier must be seen in light
of this theory.2
Another characteristic of some of the industries in question — telecommunica-
tions in particular — is the degree of sophistication in pricing behavior: the typical
tariﬀ is non-linear, and normally consumers are oﬀered the choice between a variety
of schemes, with the purpose of price discriminating between heterogeneous con-
sumers.3 The aim of the present paper is to study the interplay between switching
costs and pricing behavior in a market where consumers diﬀer in some respect rel-
evant for price discrimination. In addition to the already mentioned literature on
switching costs and non-linear pricing, there are also many contributions studying
1Other proposed solutions include product diﬀerentiation (physically or informationally) and
tacit collusion, as laid out in any modern treatments of Industrial Organization, e.g. Tirole (1988).
2Examples of such barriers include frequent-ﬂyer’s programs used by airlines (for some Nor-
wegian evidence, see Risvold 2000) and subsidizing new mobile phone customers’ purchase of the
phone if they sign up for a minimum period of one year (for some Norwegian evidence, see Seime
1999).
3Such pricing behavior reﬂects the fact that the products in question are typically non-
transferable services, eﬀectively limiting the possibilities for arbitrage. Moreover, the ﬁrms have
limited information about diﬀerent consumers’ tastes, or they are (explicitly or implicitly) re-
stricted from exploiting the little information they have about tastes in diﬀerent sub-markets (one
could for instance imagine prices that diﬀer according to gender, age and location), leaving second-
degree price discrimination as the only viable price discrimination option. (See Wilson, 1993, for
a survey of non-linear pricing.)
2non-linear pricing in more or less competitive settings. What these contributions
have in common, however, is that they model other sources of market power than
switching costs. Wilson (1993, part 12.3) consider Cournot competition, while Stole
(1995), Armstrong and Vickers (1999) and Rochet and Stole (1999) are examples of
studies based on the assumption that products are diﬀerentiated.
To our knowledge, none has studied the eﬀects of switching costs in a homogeneous-
good duopoly with switching costs and heterogeneous consumers. We conduct the
analysis within a model allowing any kind of non-linear pricing. Our main result
is that heterogeneity tend to reduce collusive stability, in the sense that collusive
pricing can be sustained with homogeneous consumers but not with heterogeneous.
One testable implication of this phenomenon is that one should expect consumer
heterogeneity and sophisticated pricing to go hand in hand with eﬀorts to raise bar-
riers for consumers who may want to switch supplier, a hypothesis that seems to ﬁt
for instance the markets for mobile telephony.
We have also performed essentially the same analysis for some other types of
pricing behavior. It turns out that our main result is rather robust with respect
to pricing behavior – whatever pricing assumption, heterogeneity tend to make it
more diﬃcult to sustain monopoly pricing. Perhaps somewhat surprising is that the
result also applies to the case of linear pricing, revealing that the main result does
not hinge upon nonlinear pricing but rather on the mere heterogeneity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present our basic model,
we deﬁne the key notion of critical switching cost, and we perform some preliminary
analysis. In Section 3 we study how consumer heterogeneity aﬀects the critical
switching costs under the assumption of non-linear pricing. A brief discussion of
how other pricing schedules aﬀect the results is found in Section 4, together with
a discussion of diﬀerent matters left out of the main analysis. Some concluding
remarks are gathered in Section 5.
32 The model and a benchmark
Consider two ﬁrms setting prices in a market with two kinds of consumers – H
(”high” demand) and L (”low” demand). The two ﬁrms oﬀer functionally identical
products, but each consumer has already bought from one of the ﬁr m s ,a n di fa
consumer wants to switch to the other supplier, switching costs are incurred. We
assume that all consumers have identical positive switching costs denoted s.4 In
particular, the costs of switching does not depend on a consumer’s demand volume.5
Next, we assume that the ﬁrms have access to full non-linear pricing. A contract
is a payment-quantity pair (qi,T i). (In the general case a menu of contracts is
described by a payment function of quantity demanded; Ti = T(qi).) Here we have
only two types of consumers, implying that each supplier oﬀers the consumers a
choice between two contracts: (qL,T L) intended for the low-demand consumers, and
(qH,T H) for the high-demand consumers.
Consumer preferences over contracts are described by utility functions that are





2 − T, for θ ∈ {L,H} (1)
where θ is the consumer’s ”type”, q is demand volume and T is monetary payment
for the good in question. These preferences give rise to individual demand functions
that are linear in prices with no income eﬀects on demand:
q = q(p,θ)=θ − p, for θ ∈ {L,H} (2)
Moreover, ﬁrms are assumed to be symmetric both as regards costs and customer
4This implies that the only candidate for equilibrium in pure strategies entails monopoly pricing
(as speciﬁed below).
5This is obviously not the only way to model switching costs. Consider switching mobile tele-
phone operator. This would entail some ﬁxed costs, for instance the eﬀort of contacting the
operators and make them do what you want, possible penalties for terminating the relationship
with your existing operator, and costs of opening a new relationship. Typically there are also
volume-dependent switching costs, for instance the costs attached to lack of number portability
which is presumably a larger problem for a pizza chain than from a typical private consumer, but
may be substantial even for private consumers.
4bases (from an at the time being unmodelled ﬁrst period).6 In particular, each ﬁrm
has a market share of 50% within each market segment (that is, for each type of
consumer). To obtain closed-form solutions to the pricing problem we need marginal
costs to be constant, normalized to zero. Finally, to simplify notation we set H =1
while L ∈ (0,1). This is without loss of generality as only their relative magnitudes
are of importance.
When we in subsequent sections describe a market with heterogeneous consumers
we are going to compare results with a benchmark with homogeneous consumers.
We will therefore perform some preliminary analysis assuming that all consumers are
identical, with demand parameter θ.T h e ni ti sw e l l - k n o w nt h a tap r o ﬁt-maximizing
monopolist will oﬀer a contract that maximizes social surplus, and by setting an
appropriate ﬁxed fee he can convert social surplus into proﬁts. Social surplus (S)
equals consumers’ utility plus proﬁts, and is given by









Social surplus is maximized by setting q = θ, and this surplus is shifted over to the
ﬁrm by setting T = 1
2θ
2. (Note that this solution can be implemented by a two-part
tariﬀ T = F + pq,w h e r eF = 1
2θ
2 and p =0 .)
Here we do not have a monopoly, though. However, as long as all consumers have
positive switching costs, Klemperer (1987) have argued – in a framework of linear
pricing – that if there is a pricing equilibrium in pure strategies, this equilibrium
must entail monopoly pricing. The argument goes as follows. Let pM denote the
monopoly price. At any lower common price, each ﬁrm has an incentive to slightly
increase its price, which more fully exploits its own customers without losing any to
its competitor. Note that even small switching costs suﬃces to make the (possible)
equilibrium switch from competitive pricing to monopoly pricing.
It should be clear that the logic of small deviations applies equally well to situa-
tions involving non-linear pricing: even if ﬁrm A uses linear prices, it would pay for
ﬁrm B to price non-linearly, for instance using two-part tariﬀs. With linear pricing
there is one single instrument – the price – serving two diﬀerent purposes: eﬃ-
6Competition for market shares at an earlier stage is left to Section 4.
5ciency and extraction of consumers’ surplus. The virtue of two-part tariﬀsi st h a t
they separate these two aims: eﬃciency is achieved by marginal cost pricing, and
consumers’ surplus is extracted by the ﬁxed term.
However, the proposed equilibrium may be vulnerable to non-marginal price
changes: it is still the case that a suﬃciently large price cut will make one ﬁrm
corner the market, and if the switching costs are too small, cornering the market
becomes so attractive that monopoly pricing is not an equilibrium either — implying
that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies at all.7 In this respect the magnitude
of the switching cost is important.
To be more precise, to attract one’s competitor’s customers, one must oﬀer them
a price cut that can compensate them for their costs of switching supplier. When all
consumers have demand parameter θ, we have seen that monopoly pricing entails
(q,T)=( θ, 1
2θ
2). In order to capture the rival’s customers, one will have to undercut
by an amount equal to their switching costs, i.e., one will have to set T ≤ 1
2θ
2 − s,












This is a more precise expression for our statement above that for monopoly pricing
to be an equilibrium, the switching cost must be large enough. Solving this inequality
for s yields the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 (Homogeneous consumers) With homogeneous consumers who have de-
mand parameter θ, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists iﬀ s ≥ s∗(θ) ≡ 1
4θ
2.I f
such an equilibrium exists, it is unique and entails (q,T)=( θ, 1
2θ
2).
7There is always an equilibrium in mixed strategies, however, see Klemperer (1987). This
equilibrium is rather complicated even in a model with linear pricing and homogeneous consumers,
and it is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyze mixed-strategy equilibria of the current
model.
8It is easily checked that the ﬁrm can not increase its proﬁt by distorting the quantities, as this
will only serve to reduce the value added without helping the suppliers to reap a larger fraction of
it.
63 Pricing with heterogeneous consumers
Now we turn to situations in which there are both types of consumers (H and L).
To simplify the exposition, suppose there are four consumers, among which there is
one high-demand consumer and one low-demand consumer ”belonging” to each of
the ﬁrms (the results generalize easily to other symmetric structures, and with some
eﬀort also to cases of asymmetric customer bases). Depending on the parameters,
qualitatively diﬀerent situations may occur. Demand from L-type consumers may
be so low that a monopolist may choose to sell only to high-demand consumers,
and a ﬁrm considering to deviate from monopoly pricing may ﬁnd it attractive to
set his prices to attract the competitor’s high-demand consumers; his low-demand
consumers; or all of his consumers. All these cases are considered below.
Monopoly pricing. Suppose ﬁrst that the monopolist wants both types of con-
sumers to buy (this is not necessarily the case). Then his problem is to design a
pair of contracts to maximize income – max{(Ti,qi)} TH +TL – subject to standard


































H − TH (8)
Suppose that only low-demand consumers’ participation constraint and high-demand
consumers’ incentive constraint bind (it can easily be veriﬁed that this is indeed
true for the optimal mechanism). We see that the ﬁrm has not preferences over
quantities – qH and qL only aﬀect the objective function indirectly, through the
relevant constraints (6) and (7). First we note that qH enters (7) only, and it
should therefore be set to soften this constraint as much as possible, implying
qH =1(this amounts to setting price equal to marginal costs for high-demand
consumers). Assuming the constraints (6) and (7) bind, by inserting them into












, with no constraints. Its solution is given
by qL =2 L − 1 (provided L ≥ 1
2) and the optimal charges satisfy










− (1 − L)(2L − 1)
Consequently, maximum proﬁti sg i v e nb y
π = TH + TL =
µ1
2








=1− 2L +2 L
2
Selling to low-demand consumers is costly in terms of giving up consumers’
surplus to high-demand consumers. If their demand is suﬃciently low – L ≤ 1
2,t o
be precise – it pays to neglect them altogether, setting qL = TL =0 .T h ef o l l o w i n g
Lemma summarizes the above discussion:
Lemma 2 (Monopoly pricing) If L ≤ 1
2, then monopoly pricing entails (qL,T L)=
(0,0) and (qH,T H)=( 1 , 1
2), with monopoly proﬁto fπM = 1
2. If, in contrast, L>1
2,
then (qL,T L)=( 2 L − 1,L− 1
2) and (qH,T H)=( 1 , 1
2 − (2L − 1)(1 − L)), yielding
monopoly proﬁto fπM =1− 2L +2 L2.
Optimal undercutting. To ﬁnd the critical switching costs needed to sustain
monopoly pricing, we now derive the optimal undercutting strategies for the ﬁrms.
To attract one’s competitor’s customers, one must oﬀer them a price cut that can
compensate them for having to bear their switching costs. Since consumers are
heterogeneous, there are two diﬀerent ways to undercut the rival: one can either
go for his high-demand consumers (to be dubbed strategy ”High”) or for all the
competitor’s consumers (strategy ”All”).9 In what follows we will describe each
of these strategies in detail, for diﬀerent values of L. We start with the simpler
cases when L ≤ 1
2, implying that only high-demand consumers are served under
9In principle there is also a third strategy: going for the rival’s low-demand consumers only. It
is easily checked that this is never a viable strategy as long as we maintain our assumption of all
consumers having the same switching costs. It could change if we allowed low-demand consumers
to have substantially lower switching costs.
8monopoly pricing, and thereafter we do the more complicated cases when L>1
2.
For each case we calculate proﬁt of an undercutting ﬁrm, and by comparing with
proﬁts under monopoly pricing we derive conditions for stability of the pure-strategy
monopoly pricing equilibrium. The purpose of this exercise is to compare these
stability conditions with those obtained with homogeneous consumers in Lemma 1,
in order to ﬁnd out the implications of heterogeneity for stability.
Strategy Undercutting ”High”. We start with situations in which only high-





.S t r a t e g y
”High” undercutting entails paying the switching costs of the rival’s H-type. In
monopoly, selling to low-demand consumers were unattractive because the big dif-
ference in demand between the diﬀerent types of consumers. When undercutting,
however, it may be worthwhile to start to sell to own low demand consumers. Sup-
pose that the undercutting ﬁrm does exactly this when undercutting. The undercut-
ting ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of contracts (qH,T H) to its own and the rival´s high-demand
consumers and (qL,T L) to its own low-demand consumer to maximize
π =2 TH + TL
subject to a new participation constraint for the rival´s high-demand consumer (he
must earn at least s to switch):





H − TH ≥ s (9)
and (6), (7) and (8).
We then have the following result:
















Proof. See the appendix.
We see from Lemma 3 that the critical switching cost is increasing in L and
it is always higher than the critical switching cost for a homogeneous population
9of high-demand consumers (as stated in Lemma 1). The reason for this is that
when undercutting the rival’s high-demand customers it becomes attractive to sell
to own low-demand customers, and this makes undercutting more tempting. Hence,
switching costs must be higher to make such undercutting unproﬁtable.
In contrast, when L ∈ (1
2,1) both types of consumers buy under monopoly
pricing. In this equilibrium the L-type earns zero and the H-type earns a rent equal
to uH =( 2 L − 1)(1 − L). The undercutting ﬁrm now maximizes π =2 TH + TL
with respect to (6), (7), (8) and the high-demand consumer’s new participation
constraint:











− (2L − 1)(1 − L)
¶
+ s (10)
This yields the following result:
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Proof. See the appendix.





is deﬁned in three pieces, depending on which of the incentive and participations
constraints that bind.
Having established the critical switching cost when undercutting the rival’s high-
demand customers, we must also check whether it might be better to undercut all
the rival’s customers. This sounds like a sensible way to undercut if L is suﬃciently
close to one.
Strategy Undercutting ”All”. This strategy involves lowering the payment by s
for all customers, without aﬀecting the issue of distorting quantities.10 This tells us
10Technically, the undercutting ﬁrm maximizes 2(TL+TH) — that is, twice the monopoly proﬁt—
subject to a set of constraints that is identical to the one facing the monopolist, the only exception
being that all consumers’ reservation utilities shift upward by an amount s.
10that it is no point in undercutting the rival’s low-demand consumers if L ≤ 1
2.I f
L>1
2, we have the following:





, the switching cost needed to block undercutting all the




Proof. See the appendix.
Stability. By comparing the critical costs for the two respective strategies, it turns
out that it requires a larger switching cost to block undercutting of all consumers





14, in which case the critical switching cost is given by Lemma 5. Since what
matters for collusive stability is whether undercutting is proﬁtable or not – exactly
which kind of undercutting will take place is of less interest – it is the highest
of the critical switching costs that is of our interest: s∗ =m a x {sH,s A}.T h e n b y
summing up the information from Lemmas 3-5, we have that undercutting with
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In Figure 1 below we have plotted s∗ together with the critical switching costs
for homogeneous populations of high-demand consumers (s∗(1) = 1
4), low-demand
consumers (s∗(L)=1
4L2) and ”average” consumers (that is, a hypothetical situation
in which all consumers have demand parameter 1+L
2 , yielding s∗(1+L
2 )).
From Figure 1 we see that s∗ (the dotted line) is non-monotonic. Starting out
from L =0 ,s ∗ increases until L = 1





it increases again. The turning points are when the monopolist starts selling to low-
demand consumers (L = 1
2) and when the undercutting ﬁrm changes undercutting
strategy from undercutting only the rival’s high-demand consumers to going after all
11Figure 1: Critical switching costs
consumers. The increase in s∗ for L ∈ (0, 1
2) is due to the increase in demand from
an undercutting ﬁrm’s own low-demand customers. Since L is low, these consumers
are inactive in monopoly, but when undercutting the rival’s high-demand customer
it is worthwhile to include them. This makes the temptation to undercut bigger,
and more so the more surplus that can be extracted from the low-demand customer,
hence the increase in s∗. When L>1
2 the low-demand consumers already buy under
monopoly. At ﬁrst in this interval, the low-demand consumers are given highly
distortive contracts to prevent the high-demand consumers from mimicking a low-
demand consumer. When undercutting it is possible to oﬀer eﬃcient contracts to
all consumers which in itself is a gain, but the gain is lower the more eﬃcient the
contract is from the outset, hence s∗ decreases. As L increases, the undercutting
ﬁrm starts worrying about the low-demand consumer mimicking a high-demand
consumer. To avoid this, the ﬁrm has to oﬀer the high-demand consumer a distortive
contract, and at some point also leave rent to the low-demand consumer. Finally,
for suﬃciently high L the undercutting ﬁrm will ﬁnd it better to undercut all the
r i v a l ’ sc u s t o m e r s ,a n dt h e no fc o u r s et h ep r o ﬁt from undercutting is increasing in L,
and so is the critical switching cost needed to block undercutting.
12It is noteworthy that for low values of L, i.e., L ∈ (0, 3
5), consumer heterogeneity
implies instability in a strong sense, meaning that it now takes a higher switching
cost to sustain monopoly pricing than if all consumers were of the high-demand
type. At the other extreme for high L we see that consumer heterogeneity instead
implies stability, but only in a weak sense. For high values of L it takes a lower
switching cost to sustain monopoly pricing than if all consumers were an average of
high and low-demand consumers.11
To summarize the ﬁrst part, we have:
Proposition 1 With homogeneous consumers, the critical switching cost s∗ ≤ s∗(1) =
1











then s∗(L) <s ∗ <s ∗(1).
4 Discussion
I nt h ea n a l y s i sa b o v ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eﬁrms are rather sophisticated price-
setters – they use general non-linear pricing schemes. We have also considered
less sophisticated pricing rules and investigated how such rules aﬀect the results. In
what follows we will present the main results from one particular pricing assumption:
linear pricing. Clearly, with linear pricing there is no scope for price discrimination.
This in turn means that the result derived with linear pricing cannot stem from price
discrimination, but must be interpreted as pure eﬀects of heterogeneity. Intuitively,
since more sophisticated pricing presumably extracts more surplus from the con-
sumers, we would expect that more sophisticated pricing creates more instability,
and we will see that this intuition is largely correct.
11At ﬁrst glance this might seem surprising. However, the reason is that when undercutting
a homogeneous population of an average of high and low-demand consumers all rent apart from
the switching costs can be extracted. However, heterogeneity implies that in addition to leaving
rent to cover switching costs some information rent has to be left to the high demand consumers.
Hence, the proﬁt that can be extracted from a population of heterogeneous consumers is less
that the proﬁt that can be extracted from a homogeneous population of average consumers, and
therefore the temptation to undercut is lower under heterogeneity than under homogeneity. As a
consequence, heterogeneity yields a lower critical switching cost.
13As in the previous section, the task is to compare the critical switching costs
with homogeneous versus heterogeneous consumers. As in the previous section, with
heterogeneous consumers the monopolist will serve all consumers if the low-demand
consumers’ demand is not too low, and concentrate on the high-demand consumers
otherwise (however, the two cases occur for diﬀerent parameter sets under the two
pricing schemes).
Performing the analysis yields the following conclusions:12 First, also with linear
pricing we ﬁnd that heterogeneity implies loss of stability, but only for parameters for
which low-demand consumers are not served under monopoly pricing, that is, for low
values of L. This result warrants some explanation. Also for higher values of L the
undercutting ﬁrm earns a beneﬁt on increased sales to his low-demand consumers,
but this beneﬁt when undercutting is more than oﬀset by the fact that the monopoly
price is set to accommodate an average consumer, with demand parameter θ = 1+L
2 .
Undercutting such a low price is little tempting. Note that this latter eﬀect was
not present with non-linear pricing, and appears here only because the ﬁrms are
restricted to one single instrument – the price – which drops discontinuously when
the ﬁrms start selling to low-demand consumers.
Second, for most levels of L, linear pricing implies lower critical switching costs
compared to non-linear pricing, suggesting that sophisticated pricing implies loss of
collusive stability. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
In the ﬁgure the solid line represents the critical switching cost with fully non-
linear prices, while the dotted line represents critical switching costs under linear
pricing. We see that the solid curve is above the dotted curve for most parameters,
indicating that sophisticated pricing tend to reduce stability of monopoly pricing.
However, the reverse is also possible, mainly because switching to ”undercutting all”
occurs for lower values of L when the ﬁrms use non-linear pricing than when they
use linear pricing.
Up to now we have taken the distribution of market shares for granted. Klem-
perer (1987, 1995) shows in his model of homogeneous consumers that second period
lock-in that is the result of switching costs may intensify competition in the ﬁrst
12D e t a i l sc a nb eo b t a i n e df r o mt h ea u t h o r su p o nr e q u e s t .
14Figure 2: Critical switching costs for linear and nonlinear pricing
period. This eﬀect will clearly be present here as well. But consumer heterogeneity
adds another dimension to the ﬁrst-period problem: in addition to setting low prices,
the ﬁrms may aﬀect the composition of its clientele by their choice of ﬁrst-period
tariﬀs. If – as the above analysis suggests – heterogeneity reduces the scope for
setting monopoly prices later on, the ﬁrms have (at least collectively) a reason to
restrict heterogeneity. This can be done in several ways: the ﬁrms may abstain from
selling to low-demand consumers in the ﬁrst period, or – perhaps more realistically
– they may specialize in the ﬁrst period: one ﬁrm sells to the high-demand con-
sumers while the other sells to the low-demand consumers. However, a full-ﬂedged
analysis of these matters is beyond the scope of this paper.
Clearly, collusive stability depends on how the switching costs are distributed,
but some alternative formulations would lead to similar conclusions as the present
analysis. In particular, letting the switching costs be continuously distributed on
an interval not including zero would basically complicate the analysis without gen-
erating much new insights. More dramatic changes would follow if the switching
costs were distributed on an interval including zero, as this will make the static
equilibrium involve some competition.13 Even more dramatic changes would obtain
13E.g. prices lower than the monopoly price but higher than marginal costs in the case of linear
15if we allowed a positive fraction of consumers to have zero switching costs, as this
will basically take us back to the Bertrand paradox.
If we were to include switching cost heterogeneity we would also have to address
how such heterogeneity blends with the already modelled demand parameter het-
erogeneity. Stochastic independence is clearly the easiest assumption to work with,
but it might be more realistic to assume that high-demand consumers have higher
switching costs than low-demand consumers, at least in a stochastic sense. Also this
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Our analysis has been conducted using a two-point distribution of demand pa-
rameters. This is obviously a simpliﬁcation that may aﬀect results, but a simpliﬁ-
cation that seems necessary as a ﬁrst step. An important issue for further research
is to investigate whether similar results can be obtained in a model allowing for
continuously distributed consumers. In future work we would also like to investi-
gate whether our choice of utility function aﬀects results. Our analysis is performed
with linear and parallel demand for high- and low-demand consumers. The linearity
assumption is a simpliﬁcation that enables us to derive explicit solutions for the
critical switching cost and to make a detailed comparison over the diﬀerent cases
considered. But also other utility functions give rise to linear (but not parallel)











There are diﬀerent ways to escape the Bertrand paradox threatening the proﬁto f
price-setting ﬁrms competing in a market for homogeneous products. We have stud-
ied one such possibility – the creation of consumer switching costs – in a market
with heterogeneous consumers. We have argued that this market structure as well as
this particular strategy to reduce competition ﬁts the telecommunications industry
in recent years. We have seen that heterogeneity tend to reduce collusive stabil-
pricing. See Klemperer (1987) for a discussion.
16ity, with the immediate implication that the more heterogeneity, the higher eﬀorts
to raise barriers for consumers who may want to switch supplier. Heterogeneity is
however not immediately observable, but it should be reasonable to assume that
heterogeneity is positively correlated to the spread of tariﬀso ﬀered, and then we
have a testable implication: sophisticated pricing should go hand in hand with ef-
forts to create consumers switching costs, a hypothesis that also seems to ﬁtm o d e r n
telecommunications markets, and the market for mobile telephony in particular.
We have performed some analysis for other types of pricing behavior, essentially
conﬁrming our basic result. It should be noted that we still have limited knowledge
about the eﬀects of consumer heterogeneity in more general models, for instance
models allowing for continuously distributed demand characteristics; models with
heterogeneous switching costs in addition to the demand heterogeneity already mod-
eled; or both. However, a full-ﬂedged analysis of these matters is beyond the scope
of the present paper and left as an issue for further research.
In future work we would also like to extend our analysis in a more fundamental
way, by allowing for dynamics, that is, by allowing for tacit collusion in addition
to switching costs. Padilla (1995) has studied the interplay between switching costs
and the scope for reaching a collusive agreement in a repeated price game, and it
should be possible to extend his analysis to allow for heterogeneous consumers.
6 Appendices
6.1 Proof of lemmas 3-5
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :Undercutting the rival’s high-demand customers entails the
possibility that none of the incentive constraints will bind. First, suppose that none
of the incentive constraints bind. This implies that quantities are set at their eﬃcient
levels, yielding TH = 1
2 − s, TL = 1
2L2 and π =1− 2s + 1
2L2. Hence, undercutting
is blocked iﬀ















17For these contracts to be incentive compatible, we must have that





L − TL = L − L
2





H − TH = L − 1+s
which amounts to the condition that L − L2 ≤ s ≤ 1 − L,w h i c hi sa l w a y sm e tf o r
the critical switching cost sH as long as L ≤ 1
2.
But the incentive constraints may of course bind for optimal undercutting if
s 6= sH, and then the expression for an undercutting ﬁrm’s proﬁtw o u l db em o r e
complicated. However, we need not analyze these cases in order to know what we
need to know about stability, and the argument is as follows. Suppose s>s H.
Then if optimal undercutting does not make any incentive constraint bind, this case
is already covered above, and we know that undercutting is not proﬁtable. s may be
so much higher than sH that undercutting makes the low-demand consumers’ incen-
tive constraint bind. But this just add another constraint to the undercutting ﬁrm’s
proﬁt maximization problem, and then undercutting becomes even less tempting.
Next, suppose s<s H. Again the only interesting cases appear when optimal under-
cutting makes an incentive constraint bind, this time the high-demand consumers’.
However, from the analysis above we know that if s<s H then there is a number
²>0 such that undercutting by sH −² does not make any incentive constraint bind.
Moreover, such an undercutting makes the rivals’ high-demand consumer switch (as
long as ²<s H − s), and such undercutting is proﬁtable (remember that the ﬁrm
w o u l dh a v eb e e ni n d i ﬀerent if undercutting by sH were required, and would there-
fore strictly prefer undercutting if a smaller amount suﬃced). (Such undercutting
is not optimal, but that does not matter for the argument.) QED
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose none of the incentive constraints bind (this will be
checked below). If so, then quantities should be set at their eﬃcient levels, and TH =
1
2 − (2L − 1)(1 − L) − s, TL = 1
2L2 and π =2
³
1




comparing this expression for proﬁtw i t ht h eﬁrm’s proﬁt under monopoly pricing,
we have that in order to block undercutting,
s ≥ s





18What remains is to check whether the incentive constraints are actually satisﬁed for
the proposed contracts. Inserting the proposed contracts in the incentive constraints







− (2L − 1)(1 − L)
¶















− 3L +2 L
2 − s
¶
which amounts to the condition that (1 − L)
2 ≤ s ≤ 2(1− L)
2.T h i s c o n s t r a i n t
holds for s = sH as long as L ≤ 2
3. (Again it is easily veriﬁed that we need not check
other values of s.)





, undercutting high-demand consumers will – for
the critical switching cost – imply that the low-demand consumers’ incentive con-
straint binds and that at least one of the participation constraints bind. The un-
dercutting ﬁrm then maximizes π =2 TH + TL subject to (6) and the following
constraints (it can now be checked that the high-demand consumers’ incentive con-

























H − TH (13)
Since quantities do not enter the objective function and qL enters (6) and (13) only,
qL should be set in order to relax these constraints as much as possible, implying



























2 − TL ≥ 0 (16)
Suppose ﬁrst that all three constrains are binding (that is, that qH is distorted
upward to extract all the low-demand consumers’ rent). Then, straight forward
computation yields
qH =













πU =2 TH + TL =
1
2
8L − 2 − 8sL +4 sL2 − 2s2 +4 s +2 L3 − 9L2 + L4
(L − 1)
2








8L − 2L2 − 4
¶
(1 − L)
Secondly, for suﬃciently high L it might be the case, however, that the low-demand
consumers’ participation constraint stops binding. Suppose this is the case. Then
by solving the two remaining constraints with equality yields
TH = −3L +1+2 L




































2 − s + qH
¶
The undercutting ﬁrm sets qH to maximize proﬁt. Straightforward calculus reveals
that the optimal quantity equals qH = 3
2 − 1


















Again we must check whether this solution satisﬁes the participation constraint of
the low-demand consumer. That is, whether qH = 3
2 − 1




































Proof of Lemma 5: Undercutting all is unproﬁtable if
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